Abstract: Three levels of trust as a social psychological construct are delineated: trust in a specific person (relational trust), trust in people in general (generalised trust) and trust in abstract systems. Whereas much research is available on relational trust and generalized trust, much less is known about trust in systems. From theory and research several assumptions are derived which are related to the development of trust in the Internet. For example, the reliability of information technology is assumed to be directly related to the development of trust in the Internet. In addition, it is assumed that in situations in which it is hard to verify the justification for trust, p eople con struct subjective beliefs which represent a t ransformation of relational trust into syst em trust. Applications of these assumptions for strengthening the trustworthiness of the Internet are discussed.
lntroduct ion
The Inte rnet age n eeds trust. The Internet presumably is the most v isible and most significant re presenta tive of the knowledge society en compassing information, knowledge, a nd the intelligen ce of syst em s (Bleiche r 2003) . An example is the cooperation of work groups in v irtual organisation s which a r e linked, distributed organisational units (Kryst ek 2003) . "Trust gains significance as a n organisationa l principle in the tra n sitio n to the knowledge societ y." (Bleicher 2003, 341) At the sam e time the Internet age has elicite d a strong n eed for security and cont rol, r esp ectively. This seems t o be a contradiction , b ecau se if p eople would have sufficiently strong trust, there would be n o n eed to exert control (Auhagen 2003) . Indiv iduals seek security in Internet applications b ecause trust is oft en not justified. The m ore security is gua ranteed, the easier it is t o h ave trust.
This idea is the focus of P er c a nd Schneider 's (2000) theoretica l r easoning : A perceived risk to s uffer a loss is counterba lanced by inform ation w hich reduces t h e risk. Such information includes contracts, system t rust, and m ore sp ecific trust.
Although the Internet is a t echnical system with stric t , built-in security m easures, it is managed, ma inta ined, a nd used by humans and ther efor e will n ever b e ab le as a system to guar a ntee p erfect security. Baurmann (2003, 337) no t es in this context, "that institutions cannot be created 'out of nowh ere' without a b asis of personal trustworthiness" . C omplex t echnical systems a r e subj ect t o a multitude of potential sources of error: software errors, design errors, and service errors.
Many activities of Internet users presuppose personal and/ or system trust. Three examples illustrate this point: Firstly, persons who exchange intimacies during a chat without knowing the identity of the other party assume that their chat partner is being truthful about his or her gender and age. Another example is an Internet user who downloads a software program from a server without knowing whether at this opportunity an additional program may be stealing its way into his or her operating system, which will ask him or her to call up a specific Internet page again and again in the future ('trojans'), or which attempts to destroy data (viruses), or which redirects the Internet connection to an expensive provider (dialers). Thirdly, the use of computer mediated communication by scientists is limited by doubts with respect to the reliability of information and by the expectation that personal interests are harmed by sharing information with others, respectively (Kling/ McKim 2000) .
Therefore, the question emerges whether social-psychological trust research is able to contribute to an understanding of the use of the Internet. Which levels of trust h ave to b e take n into ac:count? Do Internet users implicitly ma ke a compromise b et ween trust a nd security, in orde r t o communica te convenie ntly on t he on e h a nd a nd securely on the othe r hand? When a re users conv inced tha t the Internet is reliable or sp ecific online serv ices or p ersons with wh om they electronically communicat e w ith a re trustworthy? Which p ossibilities exist to constrain the da n gers of misuse of the Inte rnet?
To answe r these questions , we a nalyse in more detail the social psychology of trust in the first section. We differentia te three levels of t rust , w hich we refer to in the following: specific trust , gen eralized trust , a nd system trust. In the second section we conside r the consequen ces of t rust insofa r as the y arerelevant for the Internet. In this context we emphasize the d evelopment of t echniques which increase security in the Interne t.
Social Psychology of Trust
Social psych ological research h as dealt with the topic 'trust' for mor e tha n 40 years. Originally, trust w as considered in the context of fac: tors which were assumed t o facilita te or inhibit coop eration in gr oups. La t er , other areas of a pplication wer e taken into account, e.g . trust in t eac:he rs and trust in d octors. In a bibliography, which takes publications on t rust until 1997 into ac:count, 797 cont ributions wer e found (S chweer 1998). In addition , recent ov erv iews (Kra m er 1999; Schweer 2003) clearly sh ow tha t trust is still in the centre of a ttention of social psych ologists.
Trust and risk a r e complem enta ry terms in social r ela tions. An emphasis on risk is generally based on mistrust , wh ereas trust is asso cia ted with less doubts about security. Those who trust other s d o not look for high security b efor e they act.
Trust is related to relia bility of informa tion which may reduce insecurity and risk. This is visible in the following definition: Trust is a "reliance upon information received from another person about uncertain environmental states and their accompanying outcomes in a risky situation" (Schlenker/ Helm/ Tedeschi 1973, 419) . Individuals make concessions to security and safety because social reality is highly complex. Effective action is only possible if the person succeeds in reducing social complexity. This is exactly the function of trust (Luhmann 1973) : Objective uncertainty is transformed into subjective certainty.
What the definition of trust does not address is the question from which sources the trustworthiness of a person is derived. The goal/ expecta tion theory of individual and simultaneaus cooperation (Pruitt/ Kimmel1977) was developed as a partial answer to this question. The assumption that another person is trustworthy is derived from several sources:
• The other person has cooperated with others in the past.
• The actor has been involved in a conflict situation with the other person in the past , in which a coop erative solutionwas found.
• T he other person communicates that he or she h as the intention to coopera te.
• It is p la usib le to assume that the other person h as com e to the insight that his or he r own interests a re b est served by cooperating because a mutual dependen ce is given.
Therefor e, if n o d irect experien ce from t h e p ast is available as a standard of judgm ent t o r ely on, t he p ossib ility exists tha t the target p er son collects information from third p ersons, wh o h ave made own exp erien ces w ith the other p erson in conflict situation s which a re eviden ce fo r his or h er trustworthiness.
A varia nt of trust w hich is especially significant in the Internet is syst em t r ust which is associa t ed wit h abst ract systems, on e of w hich is t h e Internet. Syst emtrust is a r elevant factor because t h e t echnical p rocesses w hich m ake up the Internet a re in gene ralnot transpa r ent for the user (Kryst ek 2003) . G iddens (199 1) consid ers t h e formation of such abstract syst ems a cen t ral cha r acteristic in the d evelopment of m odern societies ( cf. Fiedler 2003) .
Instead of receiv ing information about local even ts t hrou gh direct per son al p erception, in t h e Inter net age p er sons incr easingly use communication ch a nnels, w hich do not stem from direct experien ce, as a source of information. Comp utermedia ted commu nication a mon g r esear ch er s in d iffer ent scientific disciplines is a n examp le (M a tzat 2002) . G iddens (2001 , 680) commen ts in this context: "Trust in other people used to b e based in the local com munity. Liv ing in a mor e globalised society, however, our lives a re influe nced b y p eople we n ever see or meet, w ho may b e liv ing on the fa r side of the world from us."
As we have seen , t rust over comes risk a n d uncertainty in int erper son al r elationships. Trust may be d isap pointed or confirmed dep en ding on wh ether t he other person misuses or respect s it. Trust r efer s to t h e r elationship b etween two people and therefore is called 'relational trust' (Jones/Couch/Scott 1997) or 'specific trust' (Buck/ Bierhoff 1986) .
Specific trust is 'the expectation that the other will cooperate' including the perception of the other's attitudes and personality traits (Pruitt/Kimmel 1977, 375) which are assumed to facilitate cooperation. Specific trust may be misused. Therefore, people are especially sensitive to cues which indicate that others misuse trust and as a consequence arenot trustworthy. The basis for this sensibility may have originated during the evolution of social behaviour (Voland 1998) . Nevertheless, people are willing to develop trust (and in a sense they are forced to develop trust). With respect to the assessment of specific trust, an optimistic patternwas found (Bierhoff 1995) : People are easily persuaded to form trust. In addition, empirical results indicate that the assessment of specific trust at two measurement points toward another person is quite stable. This shows that the impression formation which is based on the first encounter has a certain stability across time. It is obviously less infl.uenced by moods than by the variables of the other person. If these variables stay constant, specific trust will not change much either.
From these r esults the conclusion is drawn tha t a certain level of trust t oward an interaction pa rtner tends to p ersevere afte r impression forma tion h as ta ken place. Presuma bly this tendenc y is even stronge r in t he Internet b ecause the communication cha nnels a re impoverished compared to a fac e-to-faceinte raction. Therefor e, the first impression which d ete rmines the initial trust level might have fa r-reaching consequen ces. This t endency might b e reinforced in the Internet b ecause the other p erson is a ble to car efully plan and ma nipula te his or h er appear a nce to a great er extent t han is p ossible in every da y inter actions . Only if a p erson a ppears to b e inconsistent or contradictory, the trust lev el will b e inst able or m ay even break down altogether.
Specific trust is an interpersonal r esource which might have p ositive effects on communication. For example, p ersons who express trust in their interaction p a rtner a re likely to rely on prosocial coping stra tegies instead of a n tisocial coping stra tegies (Buchwald/ Schwarz er 2003) . The media ting role of sp ecific t rust on the facilitation of interper son al communication in face-to-face inter action which was d emonstrated by Buchwald (2003) is likely t o ex tend to Internet communication.
Specific trust is diffe rent from 'gen eralized trust ' , which is d efined "as an exp ecta ncy h eld by an individual or a group tha t the word, promise, verbal or w ritten sta t ement of another indiv idual or group can be relied upon" (Rotter 1967, 651 ) . Gen eralized trust is not the sam e as naivety or gullibility (Rotter 1980) . Even p eople w ho a re cha r acterized by a high level of generalized trust a re sensitive t o b e t rayal by others. In addition, generalized t rust has m a ny favoura ble consequences for the 'high b eliever '. Emp irical results show tha t high b eliever s a re attractive for others, they a r e preferred as frien ds by othe rs, a nd express m ore ha ppiness.
In the following, the issue of gen eralized trust is discussed in more d etail. It is measured b y st at em ents like "In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy." "Parents usually can be relied upon to keep their promises." "Most elected public offleials are really sincere in their campaign promises."
Amelang, Gold and Külbel (1984) distinguish four dimensions of generalized trust: trust in official institutions, trust in other people in general, trust in experts, and trust in the correspondence between verbal statements and real actions to which they refer. This dimensional classification of generalized trust is only partially applicable to the Internet. But the dimension 'trust in experts' might be relevant for the use of information and communication technologies, the installation of which is dependent on expert knowledge. The higher the trust in experts, the more willing a person might be to demonstrate trust in the Internet. This assumption waits for empirical validation.
In addition, the question whether the assumption of a specific dimension of Internet trust is viable is an issue of further research. Presumably, an indep en dent dime nsion of Internet trust is mor e likely to develop if the Internet in its social r epresent ation is m or e distant from other communication services like radio, TV, or p hon e. On the oth er side, if radio, TV , or phon e become increasingly available on the Internet, t he distinction between Internet trust and oth er d imension s of gener alized trust m ay becom e unnecessary.
Be t his as it m ay, emp irical research sh ows tha t the aforem ention ed dimensions of gen eralized trust a r e positively correla t ed wit h each othe r. For example, if a person expresses stron ger mistrust in exp erts, the mistrust in the correspondence b et ween ver b al stat em ents a n d real actions is also stron ger. T he contentsp ecific differen tiation of sever al areas of gen eralized trust p roves to m a ke sense if sta t ements about the expect ancies of a person in a sp ecific domain a r e aimed a t. From this v iewp oint it seems d esira ble to measur e gener alized Internet t rust by d eveloping an appropria t e inventory.
The d istinction b etween t h e specific and t h e gener alized lev el of t r ust is of great significan ce because b oth forms of trust are independent of each oth er. Tha t is, the level of gen er alized trust does n ot have a n y implications on specific t rust (B uck/ Bierhoff 1986) . T he correlation b etween sp ecific and gener alized trust is a b out ze ro. This zero correlation points out that specific trust is not a d erivation of gene ralized trust (B uck/ Bierhoff 1986) . A pplied t o the Internet , this means t h at the level of t rust in exp erts, for exam ple, w ill b e almost completely independent from the trust which a person who participates in a ch a t room h as towar d a sp ecific ch a t partn er. Here the limitations of t h e m easur eme nt of gen er alized trust a r e clear. Even if gen eralised trust t oward the Internet is m easured, it is p resuma bly no r eliable basis for p redicting trust in a specific chat p a rt ne r.
The third t ype of trust is na m ed syst em trust which is defined as "h aving con fiden ce in 'abstract systems' " (G iddens 2001 , 680) . It is possible to distinguish d ifferen t facets of syst em t rust (Büssing/Broom e 1999): One facet of syst em trust is tha t confidential informa tion is t reat ed confiden tially a n d tha t the participant believes that system security is guaranteed. Another aspect is that the reliability and speed of information transfer is trusted in. A third aspect is that the information and communication technology functions reliably.
These facets may be summarized under the heading 'socio-technical system trust' because it is related to technical and social structures of an organisation. Statements which were developed to measure socio-technical system trust include:
"One can be sure that information sent within the organisation reaches the addressee." "One can depend on the correct functioning of information and communication technology."
The last item does not directly address trust in Internet technology, but it can be used as a model for formulating statements to assess Internet trust, for example:
"One can depend on the correct functioning of the Internet."
The d evelopment of a questionnaire m easuring trust in the Internet as an abstract system is a n important prerequisite for research in this a r ea. To illustrate h ow importa nt the issue of syste m trust in the Internet is we describe the structure of the Internet in more detail. The Internet structure is so complex that even experts a r e not knowledgeable a b out all of its facet s. Computer laypersons consider it a black box m ost of the time. The functioning of the Internet is dependent on the error-free coordination of various hardwa r e and software components. To describe the functionality of n et work syst ems, several models a r e available: The m ost well-known models a re the ISO (International Standards Organization), the OSI-la yer m od el (Open Systems Interconnection) , a nd the layer m odel of the US defence department which is the b asis of the Internet (DoD). The communication process is subdivided into seven layers, each of which has its own tasks and its own protocols (see Table 1 ). A protocol is d efined as a set of agreements r eferring to how d ata are tra nsferred from one progra m to another. Each layer may use differe nt protocols. If data are sent, each layer gives the data plus own protocol information, the so-called 'header', to the next lower layer. The protocol information reveals who has sent the data and who is the receiver, which route the data are supposed to take during transference, how they are expected to be worked off or how they are expected to be treated by the receiver. On the receiver side, the layers are run through in reverse order. Each layer works off protocol information which is targeted for it, removes it, and sends the remaining data to the next higher layer until the application layer is reached.
OSI-Model DoD-Model Protocols
Attacks and defence measures are principally possible at each layer. From the point of view of the user, the most important layer which is under his or her control is the application layer. Many programs ask for access to the Internet, justified or unjustified. In this context, desktop firewalls have an important security function. At the level of the transport layer, network firewalls apply which frequently are integrated into the router.
System trust is only marginally connected with organisational bonding and work commitment. Instead, these are more strongly influenced by personal trust (Büssing/Broome 1999) . An example for the combined effect of level of specific trust a nd level of syst em trust is buying goods in the Internet ( eBa y, D öring 2003). The willingness to bid in such an a uction b ecomes gr eater as the reputa tion of the agent (system trust) a nd p e rceived r eliabilit y of the selle r of the item (specific trust) increase. The importa n ce of trust and d istrust, r esp ectively, b ecomes pa rticula rly visible when the buyer must first pay for the goods b efore receiving them. This type of trust building ( or distrust building) in eBay transaction s has not yet b een examined in a n y great detail. However , one can assume that agent r eputation can b e h eighte ned throu gh sp ecific m easures (Per c/Schneider 2000). Such reputa tion-e nhancing techniques a r e very importa nt in t h e Internet b ecause they can help lower t he risks involved in su ch transactions ( cf. other contributions to this volume).
Selected Techniques Which Increase Security in the Internet and Consequences For Trust
In the following we d iscuss techniques which increase security in the Internet a nd h ow they affect trust of the user. In which ways can trust influe nce an indiv idual's use of the Internet? A first considera tion is based on the knowledge that trust is connect ed with coop era tion (Deutsch 1958; Pruitt/ Kimmel 1977) .
If there is high trust in the coop e rative attitude of others, the n the individual w ill coope ra te m ore r eadily tha n if trust is low. The prerequisite for this , h owever , is tha t the p er son is a t all interest ed in coopera tion. Tra nsferring this to the Internet on e can expect that high system trust inc reases the r eadiness to ma ke n ew contact s, t o send informa tion, a nd to use new m eans of communica tion. Trust is on e prerequisite for using the Interne t b ecause ther e is no way to ensure p erfect security, as illustra t ed by nume rous ex a mples for security breach es which have occurred in the past. From this p ersp ective, an interesting question is h ow high the p e rson's t rust in the Internet should be under t he premise tha t we are dealing with a system in which conflicting interests of different users exist. Presumably, such a system functions in an optimal way if there is a moderate degree of trust (cf. Gamson 1968) . If individual system users place too much confidence in the system, they are being careless because the danger of intentional disturbances or disruptions as side-effects of advertisements, for example, is omnipresent.
Furthermore, it appears sensible to vary the degree of trust depending on who is the sender. If there is no previous knowledge of the sender, a higher degree of mistrust is appropriate than if the sender has already proven to be trustworthy in the past (cf. goalj expectation theory). However, the fact that thesender is known is no guarantee for receiving reliable information. Deliberate manipulations by third parties can distort messages from senders or initiate messages from text fragments stored on the sender's computer.
In which cases will the degree of subjective trust be high? Trust will be particularly high if control mechanisms, the effectiveness of which the user is completely convinced (e. g. anti-virus software), are directly available and easy to use.
Another exam ple is online banking . The b a nk bears the costs a nd responsib ility of ensuring secure tra nsactions , wh ereas the custome r does not have to invest a nything, w ith the p ossible excep tion of having to use a specific browser or add-on p rogra m. However , if the b row ser or add-on is a p roprietary p roduct w hich r uns only on a sp ecial op era ting system , then the n ecessary t ime a nd effort for the user can inc rease trem endously. Trust is a n importa nt prer equisite for using this system, w hich uses a passw ord to ensure sec urity. T h e p rocedure a per son fo llows in online banking w hich is design ed a nalogously to using a n AT M (Automa t ed Teller Machine) p resuma bly incr eases the sub jective confiden ce of t h e b ank customer. T his makes it m oreeasy for t h e custom er t o entrust hirnself or h erself t o the online banking system , even thou gh la rge a m ounts of mon ey may be involved. This can lead to exaggera t ed ideas a b out the security level accompa n ying each t r a nsaction.
One way to heigh ten security in the Internet is the p referred use of information ste mming from certified sender s. A number of p rivat e companies (e.g. VeriSign) sell certificates to b usinesses, w hich in t urn can resell t h ese certificates t o others, or to end users (e.g ., web b usinesses) . If the b rowser of the addr essee receives the certificate, a verification of t he sen der is started. T his inq uiry is directed to the original certification agen cy; if it is confirmed, then t h e cer tification is accep ted. If not, then the b rowser issues a warning. In general, a certificat e contains a n en cryp tion code, which ensu res t h at t h e addressee receives the uncha n ged, original m essage.
Extrem e mistrust of the Internet limits com munication possibilities. However , this mainly applies t o persons who do n ot h ave much knowledge about data t ransmission in t h e Int ernet . M ore k nowledgeable p ersons can encode their messages or use altern ative operating systems, such as Linux. On the oth er side, simply using a n other Op era ting syst em su ch as Linux is n o gua r a ntee for m ore security. T his functions only as long as t he re a re less v iruses fo r the Linux op-erating system than for Windows (in other words, as long as the vast majority of users use the Windows platform).
Another important question is how much control over his or her computer does the individual have (i.e., company computer or private computer). In any case, trust interacts with the system knowledge of the user (about the operating system, application software, and Internet technology).
Incidentally, the comparison of operating systems shows that there are different ways to deal with the complexity of computer-supported communication.
Windows simplifies the processes in so far as the user is not directly confronted with system administration processes. However, with Ctrl+Alt+Del a user can activate the task manager, which displays information about running processes, memory usage, and systemvariables (handles, threads). In contrast, Linux automatically sends many process status messages to the user. When Linux starts up, a lot of information is displayed concerning the status of the start-up process. (This information is also accessible in Windows if the user opens the respective file which documents the start-up process.) Naturally these messages only make sense if the user knows what they mean, which often is not the case.
In the case of limited computer knowledge, the perception of safety is rather a n illusion of security tha n a n objective judgeme nt. If, for example, a virus scann er is used, this w ill incr ease subj ective confidence. However, this heightening of subjective security can b e a complet e illusion if the v irus scanner is outdated , b ecause it is n o lon ger able to identify all the latest viruses. Presumably, a user 's subjective distrust is primarily connected with past exp eriences of data loss, virus attack, or compute r crashes, in other words, relevant n egative prior exp eriences. If h arm is caused , it makes a difference if the darnage w as r estricted to the user 's work a rea or if his or h er reputation was harmed. The latter type of d a rnage should h ave p a rticularly str ong n egative effect s on the user 's trust.
Finally, we will turn t o t echniques tha t h eighte n security, so that the user must must er up less trust in order to have confidence in the system 's reliability (in the sense of trust readiness as defined by P er c/Schneider 2000). These m ethod s a re based on a highly r eliable verification process of t h e identity of server a nd dient, in order to prevent t hird pa rty attacks (i.e., man-in-the-middle a ttacks) . One example is the use of the Ke rber os system; althou gh it ensures a high degr ee of security in the Internet, it is implemented only ra r ely. Besides the server of the sender , this system requires t wo further servers, which provide for auth entication and a uthorization. Authe ntication confirms the iden tity of t h e user. However, at present the use of digitally signed messages is more the exception than the rule. In addition, there is the proble rn tha t others may b e able to read the m essage. This problern can b e dealt with by using a n en cryption code. Authoriza tion means that a confirmation is given that the client is allowed to access the server. Numerous communications a r e exchanged b etween the respective server s a nd thesender (sending the session en cry ption cod e et c., ensuring that the a uthentication by the sp ecified server ta kes place, etc.) in order to gu a ra ntee the desired level of security of information exchange between client a nd server.
Authentication and authorization are components of a system, which allow a verification of identity (Döring 2003, 54 7) . In order to eliminate virtually all sources of risk, extensive preventive measures are necessary, which most clients are not willing to underta ke, even if they theoretically have the knowledge to protect themselves. This is so because excessive resources must be expended (i.e., time and money) in order to realize so high a degree of Internet security that the dient would only have to muster up a minimal degree of trust in the system.
Less sophisticated methods, such as those employed in online-banking and based on the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) (often symbolized by 'https' in the address line), do not complet ely rule out attacks by third parties (man-in-themiddle attack), because it is not possible to guarantee that the recipient is actually interacting with the intended server (however, after the attack, one can trace back where the attack came from).
In many Internet services, usually also in sending and receiving email messages, the users alone are responsible for their security. More often than not this mea ns that no precautionary measures are taken. For email, for example, relia ble methods such as PGP (Pretty G ood Privacy, which is one of the m ost widely d istributed p ublic key en cry ption tools) or G PG (Gnu Privacy G ua rd, w hich is an op e n sour ce implem entation of P G P) h ave existed for years. T h eir use, however , requires basic k nowled ge of en cryption methods .
Public K ey Encryption
C lassic m ethods for en cr yp tion use only on e key for enc ryption, which thesender uses to en cr yp t t h e m essage. In or der to decr ypt it, the r eceiver needs the ver y same key. Thus, this key must b e given to t he receiver in such a way t h at no othe r p er son can gain access to it . If som ebod y else receives access to the key, t h is meth od of en cry pt ion is worthless.
The use of so-called pub lic keys can b e a solution. Public K ey Encryption is a concept using two keys. O ne key is a public key t h at can b e d istribut ed through all sorts of elect ronic ch a nnels a n d may be obtained by a n y per son. The other key is the privat e key. T his key is secret and ca nnot be accessed by oth ers; it is only available to the owner. If t h e system is well imple men ted, the secret key cannot b e derived from the p ublic key. The sen der enc rypts the message with t h e p ub lic key belon ging to t h e receiver. D ecry pt ion is clon e with the secret key of the receiver.
Cru cial in this concept is tha t t h e secret key rem ains a secret; it should n ot be disclosed or becom e accessible to anyon e else but t h e own er. Also, it is very unw ise to use G PG or P G P over t elnet (you should consider avoiding the use of telnet altogether because of t h e high secu rity risks) .
Digital Signat ures
In order to assure tha t a m essage was r eally sent by t h e alleged sen der , t h e concept of digital signa tures was developed. As the name says, a message is digitally sign ed by the sen der. T his signa ture proves t h at the m essage is a u t h entic. T his technology can reduce the risk of Trojan horses (e. g., a message that claims to be a patch for a specific problern but actually contains a virus or destroys data on the computer). Also, information or data can be verified as coming from a legitimate source and thus be regarded as correct.
A digital signature is made through a combination of the secret key and the text. Using the senders' public key, the message can be verified. Besides checking if the message stems from the original sender, the content is also checked. Thus, the receiver of the message knows that it really came from the original sender and that it has not been changed during data transmission.
Web of Trust
A weak point of public key algorithms is the distribution of public keys. A user could bring a public key with a false user ID into circulation. If messages are made with this particular key, the intruder can decode and read the messages.
If the intruder passes it on this attack goes unnoticed.
The PGP solution (the same applies to the GPG solution) exists in signing codes. A public key can be signed by other people. This signature acknowledges that the key used by the UID (User Identification ) actually b elon gs to the person it claims t o b e from. The user of GPG must decide for hirnself or herself h ow fa r trust in t he signature is warra n ted. Y ou can con sider a key as trust worthy if you trust the sender of the key a nd know for sure tha t the key really b elongs to t h at person. O nly if you can trust the key of the sign er , you can also t rust the signat ure. T o b e absolutely sure tha t the key is correct, you h ave to compa re the finger print over relia ble channels.
Trust Centres
A t r ust centre is a cer tification a u t h ority in accor dan ce w it h the digital sign ature act .
In order to ensure tha t a certain public electronic key b elon gs to a certain p er son or instit ution w it hin a public key infrastructure (PKI, a highly trust ed and independent third p a rty must h ave r eliably examined the assignment b efore ha nd. T hus, t his third p a rty can vou ch for t he identity of the key own er. This t r usted third pa r t y is t h e so-called t rust centre, w hich fu nctions as a kind of 'electronic not a ry' . After the ide ntification of a person, e.g . b y identity card, t h e t rust centre issu es a d igital certificate to confirm t h at a sp ecific electr onic key b elon gs t o a sp ecific certificate own er. The certificat es a r e st ored in a secure electronic database, which is always accessible so tha t a n other p erson can ch eck the validity of the cer tificate and the au t henticity of the owner at a ny time.
The certificat es a re generated by the trust centre using so-called certificate servers and stor ed on 'direct ory servers'. For secu rity r easons a certificat e is only valid for a specific le ngth of time. If the certificat e expires or is invalidated , it will b e re moved from the director y server and st ored in a 'CRL ' (Certificate Revocation List) , w hich is always accessible. W ith the help of this revocation list , on e can ch eck w h ether a certificat e was valid a t a certain time or not.
In orde r to e nsure the c redible and relia ble op era tion of a trust centre a nd to guarantee--if necessary-that a digital signature is legally binding, the German signature act has set up strict standards governing the establishment and operation of a legally recognized certification authority. In Germany the Institute for Telematics is the institution, which has the task to ensure compliance with legal regulations and watch over their technical implementation. Why is PKI not yet widely implemented? Some reasons are:
• It is more complicated than originally believed, therefore it will take some time until this technology is generally accepted.
• Users are not aware of possible risks, in other words, they place too high trust in the system.
• A PKI could prove to be bothersome in the sense that a boss cannot tell his secretary to sign his name in his absence.
• There is (covert) political resistance.
• The 'killer application' is missing.
• The n ecessary securit y infrastructure cannot b e implem ented on insecure computers, which oft en a p plies to sta nda rd PCs.
Virtual Private N e tworks
Businesses a re well-adv ised to accommodat e the needs of rem ote employees. An elegant m ethod t o mitigate m a ny p otential risks involved in d a ta transfer is the use of a Virtual Priva te Ne twork (VPN) , which tunnels all electronic communication b e tween distant corpora t e n et work sites t hrou gh t he Internet. The la test t echnical d evelopments promise tha t sophisticated a uthentication a nd en cryption procedures w ill ensure almost completely ta p-pro of d a ta t r a nsmission through the Internet, if these are carefully implem ented. In the following we will address VP Ns in m or e d etail b eca use t h ey a r e b ecoming increasingly p opula r (since these networks provide high security against d ata ta pping and message ma nipula tion). Basically, the main objective is safe d at a access, for exa mple, for r emot e workers. The h eart of the t echnique is the cr eation of a tunnel with an e ntra nce and an exit. All d a ta b et ween the t wo ends of the tunnel is encry pted , so that an eavesdropp er h ears n othing but white n oise. Currently many businesses a r e expanding their pr iva te n etworks to 'virtual private n etworks' by tunnelling the Internet.
Virtual privat e n etworks a r e attractive because of their low cost , since t h ey do not r equire their own physical infrastructure. Dedica ted lines, call-in p orts in the own n et work, call-back Internet access, own radio-controlled or ca ble connections b etween compa ny branch es or between bra n ch a nd teleworkers a re no langer n eed ed. A normal Inte rnet connection for all n et worker s is sufficient. De p ending on h ow broad the b a nd is or how lon g online time is, on e can ch oose b etween m od ern, ISDN, DSL , or LAN t o access the Internet . The actual d a ta transmission takes place over the public Internet.
Since the Internet is a vulnerable space, in which every user must fear his or her data being manipulated or spied upon, the 'normal' use of the Internet would be too risky. Conventional encryption methods on the protocol layer or application layer necessitate a high degree of attention of all involved parties. The principle underlying the VPNs simplifies safe data communication by transferring the entire data stream in encrypted form between the users of the network. VPNs are--so to speak-a network in a network, which remains transparent for applications as well as users. In simple words, a VPN is a private network that uses a public network (usually the Internet) to connect remote sites or users.
Perspectives For FUrther Research
Research on 'Trust in the Internet' is just beginning. A number of research tasks are pressing and promising at the same time:
• the development of questionnaires to measure psychological constructs in general (e.g. personality dimensions; HerteljNaumann/Konradt/Batinic 2002) and trust in the Internetmor e sp ecifically (cf. Batinic/Reips/Bosnjak 2002) ;
• the development of m eth ods and instruments for exp erimentation in the Internet (see R eips 2002);
• the application of devices for risk and security assessm ent in the Internet and the supplement of technological approaches by psychological perspectives on interper sonal and system trust;
• the r elation ship between trusting behaviour on the one hand a nd perceived relia bility of information on the other h a nd in computer-mediated communication (cf. Matzat 2002) .
The Internet is a n ew medium of communication which offers a large increase in information exchange among p a rticipa nts. But it is not without h azards. A con tinuing t ask will be to find the optimal bala nce between gullibility and para n oia . This balance isamatt er of individual prefer ences and of organisational climate, r espectively. At the same time, it is a n empirical question how the b ala n ce between trust a nd distrust r elates to successful use of the Internet. 
